# "address poisoning" — X 热门讨论 (2026-09-25 16:12 UTC)
## @0xZephh (Zeph) · 09-25 14:13 · ♥126 ↻3 💬48 Crypto payments have had this quiet flaw for years and nobody really talks about it, one address you use once becomes a permanent trail. anyone can look up everything that address ever received.
what @Americanfort_io built with send-to-name clicks for me because it fixes the actual mechanism.
you send to a fortressname like a normal handle, and the wallet spins up a fresh one-time address for that specific payment.
settlement still lands on the native chain, nothing weird happening under the hood, but the public-facing trail stops linking back to one fixed wallet. the address-poisoning angle is the part i didn't expect.
copy-pasting long wallet addresses is exactly what makes those attacks work in the first place. take that step away and you close off a whole class of scams people fall into by accident.
one name working across 13 networks, live inside wallets rather than another app people have to remember to open, that's the kind of design that actually gets adopted versus admired from a distance.
send-to-name is live now, safesend still cooking.
grabbed my fortressname already: https://t.co/6mME5P6r0X https://x.com/0xZephh/status/2103488102497243170
## @Ox_milo (Milon) · 09-25 15:18 · ♥39 ↻1 💬40 GN Everyone
A $50M loss from copying the wrong wallet address sounds extreme.
But the scary part is how normal the mistake actually was.
Address poisoning works because we’ve trained ourselves to trust the first and last few characters of a long wallet address.
An attacker only needs to make the wrong address look familiar.
That’s why I found @Americanfort_io Send to Name approach interesting.
Instead of asking users to copy and compare another 42-character string:
→ choose a FortressName → the system generates a fresh one-time address → the payment settles on the native blockchain → the name doesn’t expose one permanent receiving address
One FortressName is currently supported across 13 integrated networks.
The bigger idea isn’t really about making wallet addresses prettier.
It’s about removing a failure point from the user experience.
Sometimes better security doesn’t mean asking users to be more careful.
It means designing the system so the dangerous mistake is harder to make https://x.com/Ox_milo/status/2103504297707069442
## @zkxwallet (ZKX Wallet | The Secure and Private Wallet 🗽) · 09-25 04:30 · ♥22 ↻2 💬0 Address poisoning specifically relies on you trusting a familiar-looking address from your own transaction history instead of verifying it fresh.
Today's entry is the direct fix. 💡 https://t.co/0sHY2MIE7u https://x.com/zkxwallet/status/2103341223733805224