Pakistan has lived through sectarian violence before. It knows how quickly religious differences can become political identities, how political identities can become security threats, and how conflicts originating beyond its borders can eventually find their way into its own streets. That history should make Pakistan particularly cautious as the war in Yemen once again threatens to become a wider regional confrontation involving Saudi Arabia, Iran and their respective partners.

The immediate conflict is not a Sunni–Shia war. It is a complex geopolitical and military confrontation involving Yemen’s internal divisions, Saudi security interests, Iranian influence, regional power competition and control of strategically important territory and maritime routes. Yet the danger for Pakistan is that the conflict could increasingly be interpreted through a sectarian lens.

· That would be a serious mistake.

The most important question for Pakistan is therefore not whether one community supports Saudi Arabia or another supports Iran or the Houthis. The question is whether external geopolitical rivalries can once again be transformed into domestic sectarian mobilisation inside Pakistan.

· That risk deserves attention now, before it becomes a crisis.

Part I — The Past: Pakistan Has Seen This Before

Pakistan’s history provides an uncomfortable warning. Sectarian tensions between Sunni and Shia communities existed long before the modern rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and it would be wrong to describe Pakistan’s sectarian violence simply as a foreign import. Domestic political developments, religious movements, state policies, the Afghan war and the growth of militant organisations all played important roles.

· But the regional environment mattered.

Following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the strategic rivalry between revolutionary Iran and Saudi Arabia increasingly acquired a religious dimension. Pakistan found itself situated between the two competing spheres of influence. The Soviet-Afghan war further complicated the situation, bringing Pakistan into a regional conflict in which Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United States and other actors pursued competing interests.

During the 1980s and 1990s, sectarian organisations became increasingly organised and violent. Religious identity was transformed from a matter of faith and community into a tool of political mobilisation. Sectarian killings, attacks on religious gatherings and targeted violence became part of Pakistan’s security landscape.

The important lesson is not that Saudi Arabia or Iran created Pakistan’s sectarian problem. They did not. Pakistan’s sectarian conflict developed through a combination of domestic and external factors. Research on the Saudi-Iranian dimension of Pakistan’s sectarian history similarly points to the interaction between regional rivalry and local political and religious actors.

That distinction matters today because Pakistan should not make the opposite mistake either: assuming that external conflicts have no capacity to influence its internal security.

They do.

The country has experienced this before. A regional conflict can provide ideological language, financial incentives, political opportunities and propaganda narratives for actors who already have an interest in mobilising sectarian identities.

· That is why history should not be treated merely as history. It should be treated as a security warning.

Part II — The Present: A Different Pakistan, A Different Battlefield

- The Pakistan confronting the current Yemen crisis is not the Pakistan of the 1980s.

It is a nuclear-armed state with a sophisticated military establishment, a large and politically active population, a rapidly expanding digital environment and extensive strategic relationships across the Middle East. Pakistan has close defence and economic ties with Saudi Arabia while simultaneously sharing a long border and deep historical relationship with Iran.

· That makes Islamabad’s position extraordinarily delicate.

The present escalation in Yemen has already created direct strategic pressure on Pakistan. Houthi forces have launched attacks against Saudi targets while fighting has intensified inside Yemen, including along the Red Sea coast and around strategically important maritime territory. The renewed conflict has raised concerns over the Bab al-Mandab, global shipping and Saudi energy infrastructure.

· For Pakistan, the dilemma is therefore not theoretical.

Islamabad has to maintain its relationship with Riyadh while preserving communication with Tehran. Reuters reports that Pakistan is already facing pressure to balance its role as a Saudi defence partner with its efforts to mediate and maintain diplomatic channels with Iran. Pakistan has even delivered messages to Tehran urging restraint regarding the Houthis.

The strategic problem becomes even more complicated because Pakistan’s relationship with Saudi Arabia is not merely diplomatic. Defence cooperation has developed over decades, while Saudi Arabia remains economically important to Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistan cannot afford an uncontrolled

deterioration in relations with Iran, particularly given geography, border security and the wider regional consequences of an Iranian-Saudi confrontation.

This is precisely why Pakistan should resist the temptation to allow the Yemen conflict to become a domestic sectarian issue.

There is a fundamental difference between a Pakistani government making a strategic foreign-policy decision and Pakistani citizens being encouraged to see that decision through a religious identity.

· The first is geopolitics.

· The second can become internal security.

Pakistan’s recent experience also demonstrates that sectarian violence does not necessarily begin as an explicitly sectarian conflict. Violence in Kurram, for example, has shown how local disputes can rapidly acquire a Sunni–Shia dimension and become much more difficult to contain.

· This is the warning that Pakistan should take seriously.

A regional conflict does not need to be imported wholesale into Pakistan. It only needs to be translated into language that resonates with existing divisions.

Part III — The Future: Sectarianism in the Age of Fifth-Generation Conflict

- This is where the current threat differs fundamentally from the sectarian conflicts of previous decades.

In the 1980s and 1990s, sectarian mobilisation depended heavily on physical networks: religious institutions, political organisations, militant groups, printed literature, public gatherings and local structures of influence.

· Today, the battlefield is also digital.

A speech recorded in Yemen can reach Pakistan within minutes. A statement made in Saudi Arabia can be translated and distributed across Pakistani social-media networks almost immediately. A video can be edited, stripped of its original context and presented as evidence of a much larger religious conspiracy. A fabricated quotation can circulate through WhatsApp groups before anyone has established whether the person allegedly making the statement ever said it.

· This is the new dimension of sectarian security.

· The conflict can move from the battlefield to the smartphone without crossing a physical border.

· That is why the language being used to describe the Yemen conflict matters enormously.

If Yemen is presented as a geopolitical struggle involving competing regional interests, military objectives and questions of sovereignty, Pakistan can analyse it through the normal instruments of foreign and security policy.

· But if Yemen is presented as a religious war between Sunnis and Shias, the consequences are entirely different.

Pakistan has millions of citizens who identify with both Sunni and Shia traditions. Most are not interested in importing Middle Eastern conflicts into their communities. Most Pakistanis have no desire to become participants in someone else’s regional power struggle.

The danger is therefore not that Pakistani Sunnis will automatically support Saudi Arabia or that Pakistani Shias will automatically support Iran or the Houthis.

· The danger is that political, religious or digital actors may attempt to persuade them that they should.

· That distinction is critical.

Sectarian mobilisation in the digital age does not necessarily require millions of people. A relatively small number of highly organised accounts, influencers, religious activists or extremist networks can generate narratives that are subsequently amplified by ordinary users. Once a narrative becomes emotionally charged, algorithms can do part of the work for those who created it.

· This is where the concept of fifth-generation warfare becomes relevant.

Whatever terminology is used to describe it, modern conflict increasingly extends beyond conventional military operations. Information, perception, identity, influence and social cohesion have become strategic targets. The objective is not always to defeat an opponent militarily. Sometimes the objective is to weaken the opponent’s ability to maintain internal cohesion.

· For Pakistan, sectarian division represents an obvious vulnerability.

A country can defend its borders with soldiers, aircraft, missiles and intelligence capabilities. It is much harder to defend society against a narrative that persuades citizens that their fellow Pakistanis belong to an opposing religious camp.

· That is why the security response must look beyond traditional sectarian surveillance.

Pakistan’s security institutions should be asking not simply whether sectarian language is appearing, but who is producing it, who is amplifying it, where it is coming from, which audiences are being targeted and what strategic objective it serves.

· That is a very different approach.

It means distinguishing between legitimate religious expression and deliberate incitement. It means distinguishing between reporting on the Yemen conflict and propaganda about the conflict. It means understanding that not every person expressing sympathy for Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iran or another actor represents a security threat.

· The objective must be to prevent mobilisation toward violence, not to criminalise identity or opinion.

The same responsibility extends beyond the security services. Pakistani journalists, religious scholars, political leaders and social-media commentators have an important role to play. Responsible reporting can reduce tensions; sensationalist reporting can amplify them.

This is particularly important when discussing religious figures, theological claims and historical statements. An old sermon, an isolated quotation or a controversial theological argument should not automatically be presented as evidence of a current government policy or a coordinated military strategy.

· In a tense regional environment, context is itself a security tool.

The same applies to social media. Pakistan’s citizens should be cautious about forwarding material simply because it confirms what they already believe. A video designed to provoke anger can be more dangerous than a false military report because its consequences can continue after the original information has been disproved.

· The security services therefore need to think beyond the traditional concept of sectarianism.

They need to think about information warfare, psychological mobilisation, digital networks, foreign influence, algorithmic amplification and the exploitation of religious identity.

· That is the battlefield Pakistan must prepare for.

· Pakistan Must Not Become Another Front

The Yemen conflict will ultimately have to be resolved by political and diplomatic decisions in the region. Pakistan cannot determine the outcome of the Saudi-Houthi confrontation, nor can it eliminate the wider rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

· What Pakistan can do is prevent that rivalry from becoming a domestic security crisis.

The country should maintain diplomatic engagement with all relevant regional actors, support de-escalation and avoid unnecessary military entanglement. At the same time, Pakistani authorities should remain alert to attempts to transform a regional geopolitical conflict into domestic sectarian mobilisation.

· Pakistan’s greatest vulnerability may not be a missile crossing its border.

· It may be a narrative crossing its border.

That is why this moment requires restraint from political leaders, responsibility from religious scholars, professionalism from journalists and vigilance from the security establishment.

The lesson of Pakistan’s past is that sectarianism can become extraordinarily difficult to contain once it becomes institutionalised and violent. The lesson of the present digital environment is that mobilisation can now occur at a speed previous generations could scarcely have imagined.

· Pakistan therefore needs to act before the rhetoric becomes violence.

· The country does not need to choose a sect.

· It needs to protect its security.

And the most important question for Pakistan’s security institutions should no longer be simply which sect is involved?

It should be:

Who is attempting to mobilise whom, through what information channels, for what strategic purpose — and what happens if they succeed?