# AI capex — X 热门讨论 (2026-09-11 05:39 UTC)
## @MilkRoadAI (Milk Road AI) · 09-10 21:11 · ♥31 ↻7 💬8 If compute is the biggest moat in AI, shouldn't we be buying OpenAI and Anthropic?
Dylan Patel puts OpenAI at roughly 2 gigawatts entering 2026 and Anthropic slightly below, with both above 5 by year end, a 3 to 4x jump each.
Together that's about 30% of all AI compute added worldwide this year and 40 to 50% of next year's is already signed and contracted.
Anthropic committed to up to 1 million Google TPUs through a roughly $200 billion financing structure involving Blackstone, Apollo, Morgan Stanley, and Broadcom, with Fluidstack building the sites.
Patel extends the trend to north of 50 gigawatts per lab by end 2028, roughly 100 combined and 70 to 80% of incremental compute.
But to be honest raw gigawatts understate it because GB300s, TPU v7s, and Trainium 3s deliver 3 to 5x the performance per watt of prior generations.
So if the labs take half of new capacity and new capacity is several times more capable than everything already installed, their share of usable FLOPS runs well ahead of their share of watts.
The unit economics are what make their capex more rational because Patel cites Anthropic revenue reaching as high as $50 million per megawatt.
Apply anything close to that against 50 gigawatts per lab and the current losses look like a financing timing problem because Anthropic is projecting $190 to $200 billion of 2028 revenue on exactly that logic.
If Patel is even directionally right, you're buying the two entities that will control most of the world's usable FLOPS by 2028, at a moment when the compute is contracted, the revenue is compounding faster than any enterprise software business in history, and the custom silicon is about to start reclaiming the margin currently flowing to chip vendors. https://x.com/MilkRoadAI/status/2098157429972500706
## @KelseyDingMD (Galaxy_Chloe) · 09-10 22:49 · ♥32 ↻6 💬6 MAG-7分化后，谁最适合做期权交易？我觉得是TSLA https://x.com/KelseyDingMD/status/2098182163737072038
## @DoveyWan (Dovey "Rug the fiat" Wan (hiring)) · 09-11 04:13 · ♥36 ↻2 💬2 Been watching Bessent plug the UST market from every direction.. the sovereign cracks are starting to show: buybacks, defending Yen (raising dollars against USTs instead of BOJ dumping them into the market) plus AI capex arms race is now competing for the same pool of capital
Hard not to be reminded of the the historical parallels Plaza in 1985, joint yen buying in 1998, G7 yen selling after Fukushima in 2011. historical context is diff but whenever Washington enters fx market the spillover is always bigger than fx itself
When the anchor asset of global capital markets, the presumed “safest asset”, needs this much active maintenance, you know something structurally unstable is cooking https://x.com/DoveyWan/status/2098263670749114751
## @onechancefreedm (EndGame Macro) · 09-10 22:13 · ♥31 ↻4 💬2 Oracle’s AI Empire Is Being Built With Customer Money, Equity and Debt
Oracle’s Q1 FY2027 results look exceptional at first glance.
Revenue rose 30% to $19.3 billion. Cloud revenue reached $11.6 billion, IaaS surged 121% to $7.4 billion, GAAP EPS rose to $1.56 and non GAAP EPS reached $1.92. RPO climbed to $664 billion.
The growth is real.
But the economics underneath it are changing.
Most of the incremental growth is now coming from infrastructure rather than Oracle’s traditional high margin software business. Infrastructure requires GPUs, data centers, electricity, depreciation and enormous upfront capital.
The Cash Flow Needs Context
Oracle reported $23.1 billion of operating cash flow.
But $11.36 billion came from customer prepayments containing a significant financing component. That represented almost half of reported OCF.
Oracle simultaneously spent $28.5 billion on capital expenditures, leaving reported free cash flow near negative $5.4 billion.
If the customer financing inflow is analytically removed, operating cash flow falls to roughly $11.7 billion and free cash flow approaches negative $16.8 billion.
That is not Oracle’s GAAP presentation. It simply shows how much cash the operating business generated without customer financing.
Oracle also sold nearly $20 billion of common equity during the quarter.
That matters.
The AI expansion is being funded by a combination of Oracle cash flow, customers and capital markets.
The Backlog Is Not Cash
The $664 billion RPO figure is impressive, but it is not near term cash sitting on the balance sheet.
At fiscal year end, only about 12% of the prior $638 billion RPO balance was expected to convert into revenue within 12 months.
Oracle therefore has to buy hardware, build capacity, secure power and commit to long term leases well before much of the associated revenue arrives.
That creates a duration mismatch.
It works extremely well if utilization remains high and major customers perform.
It becomes dangerous if demand weakens after the infrastructure has already been built.
The Hidden Leverage
Oracle carries roughly $125 billion of reported borrowings, with quarterly interest expense already at about $1.43 billion.
But conventional debt understates the commitment.
Oracle has also disclosed roughly $260 billion of additional long term data center lease commitments, largely spanning 15 to 19 years, alongside major power and infrastructure purchase obligations.
The old Oracle primarily sold high margin software.
The incremental Oracle is increasingly becoming a capital intensive infrastructure operator.
The Late Cycle Vulnerability
Oracle added 850MW of data center capacity and delivered more than 300,000 GPUs.
That creates enormous fixed costs and power requirements.
If energy prices rise and Oracle cannot fully pass them through, margins compress.
If it does pass them through, customers face higher compute costs and utilization can weaken.
The biggest breakpoints are straightforward.
• Higher power costs • A major AI customer delaying capacity • Utilization falling while depreciation and leases remain fixed • Credit spreads widening while financing needs remain high
Oracle has proven that AI demand is enormous.
It has not yet proven that this buildout can fund itself without continued customer advances and outside capital.
The most important combination this quarter was not just 121% IaaS growth or $664 billion of RPO.
It was $28.5 billion of capex, $11.4 billion of customer financing inside OCF and nearly $20 billion of newly issued equity.
That is where the real risk now sits. > 引用 @Barchart: Holy Oracle $ORCL 📈📈 https://t.co/IzLb5eecRu https://x.com/onechancefreedm/status/2098173090848981456